After eight months of obstructionism from the Labour Friends of Israel government of the UK, tomorrow is the day on which the Scottish Court of Session will finally decide whether to go ahead with the judicial review it granted in January, or kowtow to Downing St.

I publish below two of the three main papers we have submitted for the hearing. The UK government has submitted nothing in advance, obviously confident it has it stitched up. The third main paper, the amended petition, I don’t have in clean form at the moment but will upload later.

It is unlikely anyone reading this in the next 11 hours of night time in Scotland will be able to get to Court Number 1 of the Court of Session in Parliament Square by 8.30am tomorrow, but if you can I should be most grateful for the moral support.

I am stating in my affidavit baldly a direct challenge to the government’s honesty. Whether this is a sensible legal strategy I do not know, but it has the virtue of being the truth.

The “paper apart” giving the argument for this hearing from the legal team makes the point very clearly that in acceding to the UK government’s continued sidelining the Scottish case the court is behaving in an unprecedented way and breaking its own rules. I have removed at least as much footnote from the Paper Apart as text remains, for the sake of readability. If anyone wants a full copy let me know.

Wish me luck. I am sleepy.

IN THE COURT OF SESSION
SUPPLEMENTARY AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG MURRAY
IN THE
PETITION
of
CRAIG MURRAY, residing at Edinburgh, EHl0 
PETITIONER
For judicial review of the Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order
2025
At EDINBURGH on the NINETEENTH day of AUGUST 2026, in the presence of DAVID
JAMES FINLAY HALLIDAY, solicitor and notary public, Halliday Campbell WS,
solicitors,

COMPEARED CRAIG MURRAY,
residing at Edinburgh, EHl0 who being solemnly sworn hereby
DEPONES as follows:-

1. I was a member of the Diplomatic service from 1984 to 2005 including six years as a
member of the Senior Civil Service.

2. One of the positions I held in my career was Head of the FCO section of the Embargo
Surveillance Centre, a cross Whitehall and armed forces body, whose objective was the
enforcement of sanctions on Iraqi weapons procurement.

3. To the best of my knowledge and belief, as a result of my work on Iraq, I held the highest
possible levels of security clearance within the UK government system, including some
which entailed a specific visit to Washington to obtain.

4. Although at the time of the publication of the government dossier on Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction I no longer held this position, then being ambassador designate to
Uzbekistan, I knew a great deal of background and many of the individuals concerned
with Iraqi weapons monitoring across Whitehall.

5. When the government dossier on Iraqi WMD was published, to my certain knowledge at
the time much of it was factually incorrect. I was on training within the FCO at the time
and spoke with several officials including some who had been directly involved in
production of the dossier.

6. I therefore know for certain that many of the individuals involved were well aware that
the dossier, which they were involved in producing or agreeing, was factually wrong. One
senior official directly concerned with the production cheerfully and cynically
acknowledged to me that it was “bollocks”. A member of FCO Research and Analysis
Department, a year after the publication, told me that people in that department had
been in tears at the pressure put on them to agree the dossier.

7. The hard truth is that officials will produce the narrative which ministers want, in order
to justify the policy which ministers wish to implement. Many civil servants take the view
that the ministers are elected democratically and make the policy, and it is the civil
servants’ job to fix the facts around the policy.

8. The policy that ministers wish to follow is gleaned by civil servants from official minutes,
from ministerial pronouncements in public or in parliament, from conversations with the
Minister’s private secretary, from the Permanent under Secretary, from remarks made by
the minister in public or private meetings with others, and a variety of different routes.

9. The Chilcott report stated that:
The judgements about Iraq’s capabilities in that statement, and in the dossier published the
same day, were presented with a certainty that was not justified
and
It is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and
assessments. They were not challenged, and they should have been.

10. I can testify that challenging the government’s desired version of the truth on that
occasion was extremely difficult and civil servants felt intimidated from doing so. The
pressures were sharply illustrated by the death of Dr David Kelly, whom I knew slightly.

11. We know from Iraq that the UK government sometimes promotes a narrative which is
factually false in order to justify its policy.

12. That is the case in the prescription of Palestine Action, with a narrative of an escalating
pattern of violence, much relied upon by the Home Secretary. It was also relied upon by
the English Court of Appeal as a predictor of Palestine action’s future behaviour. Yet it is
an entirely false narrative.

13. In matters of intelligence and national security the government can in particular not be
relied upon to produce an honest narrative of the facts, and the civil service cannot be
relied upon to act with integrity in the service of government.

14. I have given, from personal knowledge, the example of Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction. Let me also give the example of torture and extraordinary rendition, also
from personal knowledge.

15. I gave evidence on complicity in torture and extraordinary rendition, appearing in person
for questioning before the Joint Human Rights Committee of the UK Parliament, the
Intelligence and Security Committee, and committees of the European Parliament and
the Council of Europe.

16. I am a whistleblower and I do not believe there is any longer any serious denial of my
testimony on torture and extraordinary rendition, which is widely cited and a key source
on the subject. But the government denied it at the time.

17. My purpose in this affidavit however relates to one key aspect of the governmental
behaviour on torture and extraordinary rendition. This illustrates the willingness of civil
servants to hide the evidence of what policies are being pursued and why, at the
instruction of or in pursuit of the perceived wishes of ministers.

18. I refer to the report of the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee on
Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition 2001-2010 HC 1113, under the chairmanship of
the Rt Hon Dominic Grieve KC. Paragraphs 130 and 131 of this report are crucial to my
evidence.
” 130. This was not unique to the Agencies. Their sponsoring Departments appear to have
adopted the same approach. We heard evidence from a former FCO official, Craig Murray,
who suggested that “there was a deliberate policy of not committing the discussion on
receipt of intelligence through torture to paper in the Foreign Office”. In July 2004, when
he was Ambassador to Tashkent, he raised concerns about the use of Uzbek intelligence
derived from torture in a formal exchange of telegrams with the FCO. Mr Murray drew our
attention to FCO documents from the same time, which we have seen, one of which
referred to “meetings to look at conditions of receipt of intelligence as a general issue”. He
told us that the meetings specifically discussed the receipt of intelligence under torture
from Uzbekistan and were absolutely key to the formation of policy on extraordinary
rendition and intelligence. Mr Murray told us that, when he had given evidence to the
Foreign Affairs Select Committee about this, they sought the documents from the FCO
which replied that the “meetings were informal meetings and were not minuted”. He went
on to say:
the idea that you have regular meetings convened at director level, convened by the
Director of Security and Intelligence, where you are discussing the receipt of intelligence
from torture, and you do not minute those meetings is an impossibility, unless an actual
decision or instruction not to minute the meetings has been given . … Were it not for me
and my bloody-mindedness, … you would never know those meetings had happened.
Nobody would ever know those meetings had happened.
131. We note that we have not seen the minutes of these meetings either: this causes us
great concern. Policy discussions on such an important issue should have been minuted.
We support Mr Murray’s own conclusion that were it not for his actions these matters may
never have come to light.”

The footnotes are essential as they detail evidence including documentary evidence, not
available to the public, which supported my testimony.

“229. Craig Murray was the British Ambassador to Uzbekistan from August 2002 to July
2004, during which time he raised concerns about the UK’s use of intelligence derived from
torture. He had been in contact with the Gibson Detainee Inquiry, with a view to appearing
as a witness. He contacted the ISC in August 2014 for the same purpose and gave evidence
to the Committee in 2016.
230. Mr Murray gave the example of photos of a torture victim in Uzbekistan that he had
sent to the FCO, which sent them to a Professor of Pathology at the University of Glasgow,
who is said to have reported that the victim had been beaten about the face and neck, and
eventually had died of immersion in boiling liquid.
231. Oral evidence – the former FCO official, 20 October 2016; FCO telegram from the
Director General, Defence and Intelligence, to the British Embassy in Tashkent, 22 July 2004
(‘Receipt of intelligence obtained under torture’).”

19. The Government response to the committee made no challenge to this account.

20. So the government machinery, especially in matters concerned with intelligence and
national security, demonstrably can produce a false narrative. The fact it comes from
government should not imbue their narrative with a false authority. Not only that, but
the written record from government can deliberately conceal inconvenient facts, policies
or other information.

21. I can testify to the truth of both these assertions from direct personal experience. They
should be borne in mind when considering the government’s assertions about Palestine
Action.

22. We have a blatant example of deliberate concealment before us. As a result of the closed
session process in Scotland, a number of redacted phrases in a Proscription Advisory
Group document have been unredacted and introduced into the open sessions.
(Respondent’s 6th inventory of productions, 7 /103 to 7 /106 of process)

23. None of these phrases was redacted because its revelation would impact UK national
security. I state that as a former expert practitioner in the field. What is obvious on the
face of these redactions is that every single one of them tends to strengthen the case
against proscription. That is why they were redacted by civil servants anxious to conceal
truth in order to forward the agenda of government.

24. This is one small example of the much bigger picture.

25. In an earlier hearing, the Advocate General stated that the reason the Scottish Counter
Terrorism Strategy Board (CONTEST) found that Palestine Action was not close to
meeting the bar for proscription, is that CONTEST is a mere “local board” without full
knowledge of the facts.

26. In fact, to my experienced eye the much more probable explanation is that CONTEST
Scotland is remote from the political desires of London ministers – in this case
particularly to please Israel – while JTAC and the Proscription Advisory Group operate
under their direct influence. The Scottish view is the less distorted view.

27. The government’s narrative of an escalating pattern of violence is simply untrue as a
matter of fact. I have been closely following all trials of Palestine Action activists and to
my knowledge there has been only one single conviction for violence against the person,
and even in that one instance the specific charge of intent was rejected by the jury.

28. The government’s claims of the escalating pattern of violence were heavily based on two
cases, usually called the Filton and Thales cases.

29. In the Thales case, in Scotland, there were no convictions for violence. In parliament
introducing the proscription and in subsequent media statements, the Home Secretary
relied on rather florid sentencing remarks by a Scottish sheriff without mentioning that
key fact.

30. I view it as relevant that the Sheriff Appeal Court in Scotland recently overturned a
decision of the same Sheriff McCormick in another case of a pro-Palestine activist; and
the court’s remarks called into question the fairness of McCormick’s proceedings.

31. In the Filton case, I attended in person two days of the trial of six activists, plus the
sentencing hearing. I carefully read detailed reports of the case every day, both trial and
retrial.

32. In an effort to substantiate its claims of violence against Palestine Action, the State
brought six charges of aggravated burglary, and six charges of violent disorder. There was
also one charge of grievous bodily harm with intent.

33. I believe these are the main “serious charges” to which the Advocate General referred in
response to my petition.

34. All six charges of aggravated burglary failed before a jury, returning not guilty. So did the
six charges of violent disorder, returning three not guilty and three no verdicts. These
charges were not attempted again by the prosecution at retrial. GBH with intent also
failed. GBH with no intent was found guilty.

35. So there is simply zero factual basis for the narrative of an escalating pattern of violence.
There is no charge of violence at Brize Norton.

36. The extent to which the state ‘s case for proscription rested on this false narrative of
violence is vividly illustrated by the bloodcurdling list of charges in the third paragraph of
page 5 of the gisted report of the Proscription Review Group in the respondent’s 6th
Inventory of Productions:

“The criminal offences of Aggravated Burglary (s.10 Theft Act 1968) and Violent Disorder (s.2 Public
Order Act 1986) have been applied to the majority of offenders identified as being directly involved in
each of these incidents, while more specific criminal offences have been applied to individual subjects
for: Administering a Noxious Substance (s.24 Offences against The Person Act 1861); Threats to Kill
(s.16 Offences against The Person Act 1861); Actual Bodily Harm (ABH) (s.47 Offences against The
Person Act 1861); Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH) with intent (s.18 Offences against The Person Act
1861); and Participating in Activities of an Organised CrimeGroup (s.45 Serious Crime Act 2015).”

37. I understand from contact with defendants across a number of cases that the state has
failed to obtain a single conviction on any one of the specific charges identified in that
long list. Today 19 August the state has failed yet again, as the jury in the second batch of
eight defendants in the Filton trial did not convict on any of eight charges of violent
disorder.

38. The state has now brought charges of violent disorder against 14 individuals and
achieved zero convictions.

39. This is a narrative which proved entirely false.

40. I find it a reflection on the honesty of the government and of its legal representatives
that these jury verdicts, which are a matter of fact, and the collapse of this narrative has
not been admitted in these proceedings and the false narrative has not been withdrawn.

41. They may of course be relying on concocted evidence from the security services in closed
proceedings, on which I am unfortunately unable to comment.

42. Similar caution needs to be exercised in relation to the claims of the extent of property
damage. In the Filton trial, the damage was not evidenced. The jury was given an
inventory of the tools the defendants had taken to break or damage Israeli weapons, but
no account at all of what was actually damaged.

43. It is my understanding from trial reports that concealing what was damaged from the
jury was a ruling by the judge, in pursuit of his further ruling that the motives of the
defendants in acting to prevent genocide must not be put to the jury.

44. Only after the verdicts in the second trial was an alleged account of the damage from
Elbit Systems given to the court. The defence lawyers attempted to question this
account, but this was not permitted by the judge. He accepted a figure of £1.1 million
from an insurance claim. As this was not open to interrogation I do not know if it
includes consequential loss.

45. Similarly the extent of property damage at Thales has not been subject to scrutiny. The
Sheriff also referenced £1.1 million and it is not clear if this includes consequential loss.
The aircraft leased by the RAF under the Private Finance Initiative which were sprayed
with water based paint at Brize Norton were reported to have been back flying within
ten days. Whether they would otherwise have flown earlier I do not know.

46. It is unique to designate an organisation involved in damage to property only as a
terrorist group. The least that might be expected is a serious explanation of the property
damage, which is subject to some ability to scrutinise.

47. There is no serious effort by government to itemise property damage by Palestine Action
in a transparent way. Let alone to give comparison to property damage by similar direct
action groups like Just Stop Oil and Extinction Rebellion which have not been proscribed.

48. The JTAC documents reveal no effort to quantify property damage or to make the
relevant comparisons. Again, I question the fundamental evidence base of the
proscription.

49. That property damage alone, which does not endanger life, is capable of being classified
as terrorism is an unusual feature of UK legislation. As opposed, for example, to property
damage to an air traffic control facility which obviously might result in deaths.

50. Some actions of other direct action groups in, for example, closing down railways and
major motorways for substantial periods, have had far greater economic effect on the UK
than actions of Palestine Action. They have been dealt with by ordinary criminal law.

51. As there is no escalating campaign of violence, and the property damage is not life
endangering nor on a massive scale, that feeds directly into the question of whether
proscribing this kind of “terrorism” is having disproportionate effects in constraining
human rights.

52. I have met personally with scores of people over the age of 70 years old who have been
charged with terrorism offences for no more that speech and assembly. All of them are
entirely respectable members of society, often from distinguished professions. Many are
pacifists, and Quakers. We do not have a consolidated figure from the Crown Office for
how many face charges in Scotland.

53. Across the UK I understand over 3,500 are charged. Recently 1,855 were listed in a single
day at Westminster Magistrate’s Court. While the simultaneous listing was explained as
an error, a further 152 were arrested, the vast majority for speech offences, outside the
courtroom.

54. Being charged with a terrorism offence is life changing. Not only do they face possible jail
sentences, they face serious international travel restrictions. On 9 August 2026 in
Glasgow I met one who told me that, as a consequence of being charged with a terrorist
offence, his home and car insurance premiums had gone up by over £600 a year in total.
I had previous met a lady who suffered debanking.

55. None of those that I have met charged with speech offences including placards was
previously a member of Palestine Action or participant in their direct action. At the last
hearing it was claimed on behalf of the Advocate General that I effectively represent
Palestine Action in this case. In my own view I do not. I represent myself as a resident of
Scotland whose human rights are curtailed in Scotland, and insofar as I can be said to
represent a group, I would view that group as the ordinary citizens of Scotland whose
human rights are being curtailed by this proscription, who usually had no past
connection to Palestine Action.

56. That all of this is proportionate is an absurd contention and the heartlessness of the
state apparatus and those who control it fill me with dread.

57. I am a resident of Scotland. I believe the direct action campaign of Palestine Action was
necessary, proportionate and in general well conducted. I should like to be able to say so
here, in Edinburgh, where I live. I apply for protection of my human rights to the court of
my own jurisdiction.

58. Where there is obviously a major and widespread effect on human rights of ordinary
citizens, a “margin of appreciation” that assumes the executive violating people’s rights
to be undeniably beneficent, truthful and well-intentioned is not reflective of the real
world.

59. I have a perspective that gives weight to that fact from relevant personal experience. I
am particularly keen to put this testimony before a judicial review in my own jurisdiction.
It is not a perspective available in the English case.
All of which is truth as the deponent shall answer to God.
Signed:

This: NINETEENTH day of AUGUST 2026
At: EDINBURGH
before me DAVID JAMES FINLAY HALLIDAY, Solicitor and Notary Public

~

PAPER APART FOR THE PETITIONER

1. THE PETITIONER’S MOTIONS
1.1 The petitioner moves the court:
(1) to recall the sist granted on 28 May 2026
(2) to invite the Lord Ordinary to report the whole cause to the Inner House for a ruling
under and in terms of rule 34.1(1) of the Rules of the Court.

2. RECALL OF THE SIST
2.1 On 28 May 2026 the court sisted this cause till such time as the Court of Appeal gave its
judgment in Ammori v SSHD (Appeal No. CA-2026-000583) “and the question of onward
appeal to the UK Supreme Court being resolved”.

2.2 On 30 July 2026 the UK Supreme Court granted its permission for the claimant in the
English proceedings to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal of England and
Wales in her Judicial Review Ammori v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 721. The Supreme Court
has fixed a two day diet (4 and 5 November 2026) for the hearing of this appeal
https://supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2026-0099.

2.3 The question of onward appeal to the UK Supreme Court now being resolved, the sist falls
to be recalled.

3. THE RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO RENEW THE SIST

3.1 On 19 August 2026 the respondent advised the petitioner that the position of the UK
Government is that it will be moving this court to “renew the sist” (sine die ?) and that the
UK Government will oppose the reporting of this cause to the Inner House.

3.2 Neither the legal nor factual bases upon which the UK Government will argue that the
court should adopt these positions has not been vouchsafed to the petitioner.

3.3 As is clear from the repeated applications made by the respondent to sist these proceedings
– as well as the respondent’s previous reliance on (misplaced) claims concerning “judicial
comity” and (it may be anticipated, given remarks by the respondent’s counsel at an
earlier hearing) fanciful and wholly unfounded submissions concerning res judicata
/issue estoppel – the UK Government’s position in relation to these Scottish proceedings
is to seek to try and avoid (or at the very least delay) the UK Government having to defend
in open court its policy of the proscription of Palestine Action on two fronts in two separate
jurisdictions.

3.4 The Advocate General’s motion for a new sist to be imposed in this case is of a piece with
that overall aim. It is not however open to this court to accede or facilitate any such aim
of the respondent further to delaying matters in the progress of this case, as we have noted
above. Instead, the only orders which this court may competently pronounce as regards
further procedure following the lifting of the 28 May 2026 sist are orders which ensure the
speedy determination of the petition”.

3.5 In seeking a further sist of these post-permission judicial review proceedings the Advocate
General has failed to identify or specify any specific Rule of Court on which she relies as
the source of the court having power to renew this sist.

3.6 That is because there is no such Rule of Court. The relevant Rules of Court applicable to
judicial review proceedings are set out in Chapter 58. This Chapter contains the principles
which are the court is obliged to apply within the context of procedural decision within
judicial review procedure, as a distinct form of recourse to the courts in public law matters.
These Chapter 58 rules make it clear that the principle of “speedy determination” applies
to the procedure to be adopted in judicial review application, both before (per Rule of
Court 58.4(4)) and after permission has been granted (Rules of Court 58.11(2) and
58.12(2)).

3.7 Whatever legal basis upon which the Advocate General now seek this court to renew and
continue a sist in this case, it clear that ex facie an order for sist does not constitute “an
order for further procedure which is “appropriate for the speedy determination of the
petition.” The Advocate General has therefore to satisfy that the principle of speedy
determination of judicial review application should be disapplied in the circumstances of
this case. She has to date failed to specify any such ground.

3.8 When acceding to the Advocate General’s motion to sist these on 28 May 2026 this court
stated that “a sist of proceedings, whether on an agreed or opposed basis, is a regular
feature of litigation” in explanation/justification for the sist. In so stating the court
misdirected itself, and acted per incuriam. This is because judicial review proceedings
are not “regular litigation”. And sists are not a regular feature within the context of judicial
review proceedings.

3.9 A search for cases in which a sist has been pronounced in judicial review proceedings
(whether in the Outer or Inner House) reveals only two Outer House case, in both of which
a sist was pronounced in highly unusual circumstances. In Craig v. Parole Board [2013]
CSOH 110, 2013 SLT 953, because of a formal written undertaking given to the court on
behalf of the Scottish Parole Board, that if two conjoined pending NI and E&W UKSC
decisions found against the Parole Board on a Convention rights issue (re Article 5(4)
ECHR and the need for oral hearing in parole cases) the UKSC decision would be followed
by it in Scotland. This meant that the Lord Ordinary, Lord Pentland, did not have to deal
with this ground of challenge and so after dismissing the common law case simply agreed
to sist the remaining aspect of the JR challenge pending the UKSC decisions.

3.10 In Greenpeace Ltd v Advocate General for Scotland [2025] CSOH 10, 2025 SLT 303,
three JRs had been raised in Scotland to beat the 3 month time bar and got first orders.
Before the case reached the permission stage, parties agreed to sist the JRs pending UKSC
decision. Again the sist was done by agreement In any event, given that permission had
not been considered or granted by the time the sist had been pronounced, so the provisions
of Rule of Court 58.11(2) on which we rely – and which provides that “(2) When permission
is granted, the Lord Ordinary must make such orders for further procedure as are
appropriate for the speedy determination of the petition” – did not come into play.

3.11 So in both the cases in which a sist was pronounced the court was simply endorsing the
prior agreement of the parties, and so no argument was put before the court as regards the
competency of such a course. And there are simply no cases (other than this court order
of 28 May 2026) in which a sist of judicial review proceedings was pronounced by the court
in the face of opposition by any of the parties.

3.12 As we have noted judicial review proceedings – unlike ordinary litigation – are
proceedings characterised by the principle of “speedy determination”. This is the key
principle for judicial review procedure. The aim of judicial review procedure is
“to focus the issues so that the court can reach a decision upon them, in the interests
of sound administration and in the public interest, as soon as possible”
3.13 Rule of Court 58.11(2) specifies that
“when permission is granted, the Lord Ordinary must make such orders for further
procedure as are appropriate for the speedy determination of the petition” (emphasis
added).

3.14 The only express mention of the possibility of the court pronouncing a sist within the
context of Chapter 58 judicial review procedure is within the context of the pre-permission
procedure for intimation, service and advertisement of the petition, the lodging of answers
and relevant documents, and notification of intention to contest. Rule 58.4(5)(h) allows
that the court might sist the cause for legal aid, but only, per Rule of Court 58.4(4), after
having “regard to the need for the speedy determination of the petition” (emphasis
added).

3.15 Rule 58.12(2) again specifies that “at the procedural hearing the Lord Ordinary may
make such order for further procedure as is appropriate for the speedy determination of
the petition and in particular may make any of the orders listed in rule 58.11(2)” (emphasis
added).

3.16 Yet Rule of Court 58.11(2) does not list the sisting of the cause as being a possible option
in terms of the court’s procedure in judicial review application where permission has been
granted.

3.17 In this, the judicial review rules are to be contrasted with various Rules of Court
applying to procedures other than judicial review, where express provision is made
regarding the possibility of the court pronouncing a sist.

3.18 Against the general principle of statutory construction that expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, the legal basis upon which the Advocate General for Scotland purports now to
rely, as she would have it, to give this court the power to pronounce a further sist in these
post-permission judicial review proceedings, is unclear, given that the possibility of
pronouncing a sist is not listed among the particular orders which may be pronounced by
the court in relation to the speedy determination of a judicial review petition once
permission has been granted for it to proceed, and there is nothing in the Rules of Court
applicable to judicial review procedure which would allow for it.

3.19 In these circumstances the primary position of the petitioner is that this court should
refuse on grounds of competency the respondent’s motion for a new sist to be placed in
this case on the grounds that:
– to grant a sist at this stage of these proceedings would be incompatible with the
principle of speedy determination which applied to the present judicial review public
law proceedings; and
– there is no applicable Rule of Court (nor any inherent power compatible with the
principle of speedy determination) under reference to which a sist might properly be
pronounced.

4. PROCEDURE TO DATE

4.1 Permission was granted for this judicial review to proceed as long ago as 26 January
2026. By interlocutor pronounced on this date the following timetable and case
management orders were made:
– parties to adjust their pleadings until 9 February 2026 being two weeks prior to the
date of the procedural hearing fixed for 23 February 2026
– final versions of parties’ pleadings to be lodged no later than 16 February 2026,
being one week prior to the procedural hearing fixed for 23 February 2026
– affidavits to be lodged in respect of those facts founded on by a party at the substantive
hearing no later than 16 February 2026, being one week prior to the procedural
hearing fixed for 23 February 2026
– statements of issues to be lodged no later than 16 February 2026, being one week
prior to the procedural hearing fixed for 23 February 2026
– notes of argument to be lodged no later than 16 February 2026, being one week
prior to the procedural hearing fixed for 23 February 2026
– parties to confirm whether they are ready to proceed to the substantive hearing no later
no later than 16 February 2026, being one week prior to the procedural hearing fixed
for 23 February 2026
– 23 February 2026 at 10am being fixed as the date for the procedural hearing;
– parties to lodge a list and bundle of authorities, marked up to indicate the parts the
party intends to rely on no later than 7 March 2026, being 10 days prior to the
substantive hearing.
– 17 and 18 of March 2026 at 10am fixed as the dates for the substantive hearing;

4.2 This original timetable appears to have slipped and was not adhered to.

4.3 Instead by interlocutor of 26 March 2026 the court – after granting a declaration under
section 6 of the Justice and Security Act 2013 that these proceedings are proceedings in
which a closed material application may be made to the court and refusing in hoc statu the
respondent’s motion for the proceedings to be sisted – set out the following timetable for
further procedure:
– by 4pm on 9 April 2026 for the respondent to lodge with the court and serve on the
Special Advocates, any application in terms of section 8 of the Justice and Security Act
2013, together with any material subject to any section 8 application;
– by 4pm on 15 April 2026 for the Special Advocates to advise the respondent
whether they object to any section 8 application, and intimate to the Respondent any
submissions in response to any section 8 application,
– by 4pm on 29 April 2026 for the respondent to intimate to the Special Advocates
any response to the Special Advocates’ said submissions,
– by no later than 6 May 2026 for the Special Advocates and counsel for the
respondent to meet in order to narrow any outstanding section 8 issues;
– by 4pm on 13 May 2026 for the Special Advocates and Counsel for the respondent
to notify the court whether a hearing to consider the section 8 application is required,
– no later than 4pm on 15 May 2026, if a hearing is considered to be required,
appoints for the Special Advocates and Counsel for the respondent to lodge with the
court a Joint Minute in terms of RCS 104.9(5) identifying the issues which cannot be
agreed between them, together with any CLOSED Notes of Argument and/or CLOSED
affidavits that they wish to rely upon,
– on Wednesday 27 May 2026 at 10am for a CLOSED court hearing to be held before
the Hon. Lord Young;
– within seven days of the hearing of 27 May 2026 for the respondent to provide,
if required, any further disclosure to the petitioner, to do so;
– for the Special Advocates and Counsel for the respondent to agree, if possible, a date
for a CLOSED substantive hearing together with a procedural timetable for the
respondent and Special Advocate to intimate to each other and to lodge with the court
any CLOSED Note of Arguments and any CLOSED affidavits that they wish to rely
upon at the CLOSED substantive hearing;
– no later than 10 days prior to the substantive hearing for parties to lodge a list
and bundle of authorities, which should be marked up to indicate the parts the party
intends to rely on
– by no later than 4pm on 2 June 2026 for parties to adjust their pleadings and to
lodge final versions
– appoints notes of argument, statements of issues, productions and affidavits to be
lodged no later than 4pm on 9 June 2026;
– assigns 10 June 2026 at 9.30am as the date for a further continued procedural
hearing in respect of open procedure at which the petitioner might participate

4.4 Again, this timetable was not adhered to.

4.5 By interlocutor dated 28 May 2026 orders with the following effect, among others were
pronounced by the court:
– permission granted to the respondent under sections 8 and 11(4) of the Justice and
Security Act 2013 for:
(i) the respondent to withhold sensitive material otherwise than to the Court and
the Special Advocate, for the purpose of the respondent’s section 6 application;
(ii) the sensitive material lodged by the respondent in relation to the section 6
application to be kept separately from the process by the Deputy Principal
Clerk;
(iii) for the sensitive material lodged by the respondent in relation to the section 6
application not to be borrowed or inspected by any party other than by a legal
representative of the Secretary of State or by any Special Advocate; and
(iv) the requirements of RCS 4.5(1)(b), 4.6 and 4.11 to be disapplied in respect of
the sensitive material lodged by the Respondent in relation to the section 6
application
– sists the cause until 30 July 2026 (being the date when the question of onward appeal
to the UK Supreme Court from the decision 15 June 2026 of the Court of Appeal of
England and Wales in Ammori v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 721 had been resolved)
(which occurred on 30 July 2026).

4.6 There has already been significant (and frankly unacceptable) delay in the progress of this
judicial review application since permission was granted on 26 January 2026 for the
matter to proceed to a substantive hearing and decision.

4.7 The delays in progressing this matter may largely be attributed to litigation tactics adopted
by the respondent in this case, which run contrary to the requirements properly to be
expected of public authorities when faced with public law based challenges to the
lawfulness of their actions.

5. THE LITIGATION STRATEGY OF THE UK GOVERNMENT IN THE ENGLISH PROCEEDINGS

5.1 In the Ammori proceedings before the English courts the UK Government has appeared
to conduct their defence to these challenges as if a “war of attrition”. In the English
proceedings the UK Government has taken (ultimately ill-founded) procedural points and
has pursued procedural appeal wherever possible.

5.2 Its overall aim in adopting such tactics appears to be to delay as much as possible any final
reckoning before and by the court as to the lawfulness of the policy to proscribe Palestine
Action in England and Wales and perhaps also seeking to deplete the financial resources
available to the claimant to fund the prosecution of this challenge.

5.3 Thus:
– the UK Government first of all opposed permission being granted to the applicant in
the English proceedings: R (Ammori) v. Home Department [2025] EWHC 2013
(Admin) (per Chamberlain J. judgment handed down on 30 July 2025).
– the UK Government then unsuccessfully appealed against the grant of permission to
take the judicial review: R (Ammori) v. Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1311
[2026] WLR 1000 (per Lady Carr CJ, Lewis LJ, and Edis LJ judgment handed down
on 17 October 2025).
– the UK Government lost in the substantive hearing of the judicial review application
before the Divisional Court: R (Ammori) v. Home Department [2026] EWHC 292
(Admin) [2026] HRLR 9 (per Dame Victoria Sharp President of the King’s Bench
Division, Swift J and Steyn J handed down on 13 February 2026).
– the UK Government then sought and obtained an expedited hearing of its appeal to the
Court of Appeal with hearing dates between 28 to 30 April 2026.
– as noted above some 6 week later, on 15 June 2026 a 5 judge Court of Appeal (Lady
Carr CJ, Sir Geoffrey Vos MR, Edis LJ Vice President of the Criminal Division of the
Court of Appeal, Lewis LJ and Whipple LJ) handed down its decision upholding the
UK Government appeal.
– once the EWCA judgment was handed down the UK Government then immediately
filed a motion with the Court of Appeal requiring that the applicant apply to that court
for permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court by 22 June 2026 (i.e. just seven
days of that court’s substantive decision upholding the UK Government appeal).
– an application for permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court was duly put before
the Court of Appeal by the applicant on 22 June 2026. But the UK Government then
opposed the grant of permission, which was then refused by the Court of Appeal.
5.4 Had the concern of the UK Government truly been for there to be a final authoritative
decision applicable across the UK on the lawfulness of the proscription of Palestine Action
it would have supported the applicant’s PTA application.
5.5 In any event, notwithstanding the UK Government opposing permission to appeal from
the decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in its favour, the UK Supreme
Court granted the Ammori applicant such permission and the matter is now, as we have
noted above, going to a substantive hearing before the UKSC on 4 and 5 November 2026.

6. THE SCOTTISH DIMENSION TO THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROSCRIPTION OF
PALESTINE ACTION

6.1 The Advocate General appears to be proceeding on the basis or assumption that if the UK
Supreme Court on an appeal from the Court of Appeal of England and Wales upholds the
lawfulness under English law of its proscription as a terrorist organisation in England and
Wales, this this ruling will apply equally to and for Scotland (and to and for Northern
Ireland).

6.2 And if the UK Supreme Court says that Palestine Action cannot properly be proscribed
under English law then – on the Advocate General’s analysis at least – it must follow it
cannot have been properly proscribed under Scots law or under Northern Irish law, again
on the assumption there are no principles specific to English law, Scots law or Northern
Irish law that might allow for a different approach on this issue to be taken across the
internal national jurisdictions of the UK.

6.3 But as we have seen from the UKSC decision in Jwanczuk that is to approach matters from
completely the wrong way round. What Jwanczuk tells is that the courts in each of the
jurisdictions of the UK have to reach their decision independently of how courts in other
UK jurisdictions have reached them.

6.4 One of the central planks offered by the Home Secretary in justification of her decision to
proscribe Palestine Action as a terrorist organisation was an incident in Scotland in June
2022. In her written statement to the House of Commons made on 23 June 2025 (over 3
years after the Glasgow incident) she said this of it:
“During Palestine Action’s attack against the Thales defence factory in Glasgow in
2022, the group caused over a million pounds worth of damage including to parts
essential to submarines.
The Sheriff, in passing custodial sentences for the attackers’ violent crimes, spoke of
the panic among staff who feared for their safety as pyrotechnics and smoke bombs
were thrown in the area where they were evacuating.
He further recorded the extent of damage to legitimate business activities which
included ‘matters of nationwide security’ and disputed the groups’ claims its actions
were non-violent.”

6.5 But it is important to bear in mind that in the English proceedings no challenge is made to
the Home Secretary’s statement made in justification for the order at issue that what
occurred during a protest incident at Thales SA, in Glasgow on 1 June 2022 constituted
acts of terrorism on the basis that they involved the use or threat of action which was said
to “serious damage” to, and only to property and was “designed to influence a government
to advance a political, religious or ideological cause” such as to fall within the ambit of
section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000.

6.6 Because the Claimant’s application for permission for judicial review on this ground was
refused in the Administrative Court below (see R (Ammori) v Home Secretary [2025]
EWHC 2013 (Admin) at [77]-[80]), the retrospective characterisation of what is said to
have happened in Glasgow on 1 June 2022 at Thales SA as “terrorism” is not a matter
which can be disputed in the English proceedings. Indeed the Court of Appeal (in its
judgment at para 150) relies heavily on what it understands from the sentencing sheriff’s
reported remarks as happened in Glasgow on 1 June 2022 in support of its finding in
favour of the lawfulness of the Home Secretary proscription of Palestine Action as a
terrorist organisation.

6.7 This is a matter which can however usefully and properly be examined in the present
Scottish proceedings. So too is the issue of consultation with actors in Scotland. A court in
Scotland is in a far better position to understand and situate the relevant actors in the
Scottish context; and separately, the circumstances of the June 2022 protest action at
Thales SA in Glasgow in respect of which the five individuals charged all pled guilty to
charges of breach of the peace. Two of these five also pled guilty to “damaging property”
in gluing their hands to the edge of the roof. And one of the five, in addition, pled guilty to
behaving in a threatening or abusive manner when police arrive to de-bond her hands from
the roof when she was obstructive and required to be restrained using leg restraints. The
first four accused were sentenced by the Sheriff to serve a total of 12 months incarceration
and the fifth who resisted arrest received a total sentence of 14 months imprisonment.

6.8 Much was made by the Home Secretary and by the courts in England and Wales that the
sheriff mentioned in his remarks the setting off of “pyrotechnics including smoke bombs”
at the start of what turned out to be a day long occupation of the premises. The sheriff
noted in his sentencing that “in one criminal justice social work report it is said that ‘the
offence is non-violent in nature and was planned as well as intended to cause disruption’”.
He then comments in passing that “throwing pyrotechnics into areas where people are
being evacuated could hardly be described as non-violent”.

6.9 But the reality is that fireworks are not firearms. The throwing of smoke bombs was
charged as and only as “breach of the peace”. None of the individual was charged with any
form of terrorism offences. The justification for the Home Secretary to found on the
circumstances of this case as a primary basis for the proscription in Scotland, as well as
the rest of the UK, of Palestine Action can therefore usefully be considered and determined
by the courts in Scotland in the present proceedings. So too can the issue of consultation
with relevant Scottish actors, a matter not considered by the courts of England and Wales.

7. FURTHER PROCEDURE: REPORTING THE CAUSE TO THE INNER HOUSE

7.1 The only question which is therefore before this court is what procedural orders should
now be pronounced in this case (given the history slipping timetables and frankly
unwarranted delays) which will best allow for the “speedy determination” of the petition.

7.2 The reality of this situation is that the present challenge to the proscription in Scotland
will not be finally resolved by the decision of this court at first instance.

7.3 Whatever decision may be taken by the Lord Ordinary – whether to uphold or refuse the
challenge to the proscription in Scotland of Palestine Action – will be reclaimed against to
the Inner House.

7.4 Neither will any decision by the UK Supreme Court on the Ammori appeal finally and
authoritatively determine the question of the lawfulness of the proscription in Scotland of
Palestine Action, because the UK Supreme Court will be exercising its jurisdiction as a
court of England and Wales rather than as a Scottish court and its decision on this matter
will bind neither this court nor the Inner House. 9 Section 41 of the Constitutional Reform
Act 2005, so far as relevant, as follows:
“41. Relation to other courts etc
(1) Nothing in this Part [3 concerning the UK Supreme Court] is to affect the
distinctions between the separate legal systems of the parts of the United Kingdom.
(2) A decision of the [UK] Supreme Court on appeal from a court of any part of the
United Kingdom, other than a decision on a devolution matter, is to be regarded as the
decision of a court of that part of the United Kingdom.”

7.5 In these circumstances it is clear that the most expedient course for this court to take in
order to ensure the speedy final and authoritative determination of the present challenge
is for this court to report the whole cause to the Inner House, without the matter going to
a substantive hearing and determination by the court.

7.6 The Inner House will be properly placed to hear and determine – without the benefit of
the view of the Lord Ordinary – the substantive challenge to the proscription in Scotland
of Palestine Action because it will have the advantage of knowledge of two reasoned
decision from the English courts – on the equivalent proscription in England and Wales –
at this stage of proceedings.

7.7 The petitioner now invites the Lord Ordinary to report the whole cause to the Inner House
for a ruling under and in terms of rule 34.1(1) of the Rules of the Court.

7.8 Rule of Court 34.3(2) provides that “the decision of the Inner House on a report to it
under rule 34.1(1) shall be final”: qv Davidson v. Scottish Ministers (No 3): incidental
application re Leave to appeal to House of Lords, 2005 1 SC (HL) 1 at §13.

7.9 This means that any decision of the Inner House, on the court’s Chapter 34 report to it, is
habile to be appealed to the UK Supreme Court (see subsection 40(2)(a) of the Court of
Session Act 1988), provided that the necessary permission to appeal has been granted by
the appropriate court (subsections 40(1) and/or 40(3) of the Court of Session Act 1988).

7.10 The petitioner submits that, instead of considering the petition and answers at a
substantive hearing and reaching his own determination on it, the option of reporting the
case to the Inner House is the most appropriate procedure to be adopted by the court in
all the circumstances of this case.

7.11If this proposed course of action is followed then it will at least allow the possibility of: the
Inner House making a decision on the Scottish challenge; and then for the UK Supreme
Court to have the benefit of the decision of two appellate courts, respectively determining
at the same time under Scots law and separately under English law, the lawfulness of the
proscription of Palestine Action. The UK Supreme Court will then be able to determine
this matter finally and most importantly authoritatively both in and for Scotland, and in
and for England and Wales.

7.12 The UK Supreme Court indeed welcomes the opportunity of being able to hear at the
same time appeals from the decisions of the (intermediate) appellate courts in relation to
legislation which applies across the United Kingdom. The resolution of any differences in
approach as between the Scottish and English intermediate appellate court is indeed said
in Jwanczuk to be one of the justifications for the UK Supreme Court’s existence.

7.13 What hearing appeals from Scotland and from England together means is that the UK
Supreme Court to get the benefit of the views of experienced appellate judges from both
sides of the border: see for example: R (Cart) v. Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28/Eba v.
Advocate General for Scotland [2011] UKSC 29; and Cherry v. Advocate General for
Scotland/Miller v. Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41. Indeed, standing that a powerfully
constituted bench of three in the Divisional Court (including the President of the King’s
Bench Division) reached one conclusion on the lawfulness of proscription; and a (very
unusual) bench of five in the Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion, the Supreme
Court would perhaps be assisted to an even greater extent than normal by also having the
reasoned determination of the Inner House available to it.

7.14 This course of hearing Scottish and English appeal together ensures, too, that a final
authoritative ruling can be handed down by the UK Supreme Court which unequivocally
applies to both sides of the border and thereby enhances and achieves the legal certainty
required to ensure compatibility with and respect for the Convention rights of all those
many individuals, north and south of the border, affected (including in relation to its
chilling effect) by the decision of the Home Secretary to list Palestine Action as a proscribed
terrorist organisation. Such an authoritative determination affording legal certainty is
needed in the present context, given that individuals in Scotland have been arrested and
prosecuted, and continue to face the risk of arrest and prosecution, for offences grounded
in the proscription of Palestine Action.

7.15 Against that background it is clear that the proper course to be followed in this case is
for the Lord Ordinary to report this case to the Inner House.

7.16 Accordingly, once the sist has been lifted in accordance with the first part of this
motion, the petitioner moves that the court – acting under and in terms of Rule of Court
34.1(1) – report the cause as a whole to the Inner House for its ruling on the substance of
this judicial review challenge.

7.17 Any suggested alternative course which may be anticipated from the Advocate General
on behalf of the UK Government – for example that the present proceedings remain sisted
pending the determination by the UK Supreme Court of any appeal against the decision of
the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, leaving the petitioner with the possibility simply
of applying to intervene in any English appeal in the UK Supreme Court – would be wholly
inappropriate, for at least the following reasons, among others:
(1) Any resulting decision of the UK Supreme Court in a solely English appeal would not
be binding as a matter of precedent in and for Scotland.
(2) The UK Supreme Court might choose to deny outright any application for the
petitioner to intervene.
(3) Even if the UK Supreme Court allowed the possibility for an intervention by the
petitioner, that court might determine that it will allow limited intervention only on
particular aspects or arguments, rather than the full range of the argument which the
petitioner might wish to present.
(4) Any arguments which the UK Supreme Court might allow to be heard from the
petitioner would be considered and determined against a background of there being
no independent Scottish court consideration of these arguments.
(5) It is particularly important for the UK Supreme Court to hear the views of the Scottish
courts because one of the main justifications on which the Court of Appeal of England
and Wales relied upon in deciding that Palestine Action was engaging in and
advocating for terrorism is a decision and sentencing remarks of a sheriff in a
criminal case at Glasgow Sheriff Court and how the Scottish authorities (the police,
the Crown and the sheriff) dealt with it (Ammori, [2026] EWCA Civ 721 paras 53,
150). Therefore, it is crucial that there is a complete and full understanding of the full
details and circumstances of that decision (and all other Scotland related decisions),
which only the Inner House can bring.
(6) In any event, there is no identity of parties (or arguably interests) between the
English and Scottish proceedings. Ms Ammori, the applicant in the English
proceedings, is a co-founder of Palestine Action and may be said to be a
representative of that organisation. But membership of an association is not to be
conflated with a desire to express support for the organisation and its action and
aims. The petitioner in the present Scottish proceedings is in no sense a
representative of the proscribed association. He is not its agent, or alter ego, nor
can he bind it in any way, nor does he in any sense act for it. He seeks to review the
proscription order because he is not, in Scotland, ‘able to freely express his political
support for the organisation’. It is on that basis that he has standing to pursue the
present challenge as a concerned and politically involved citizen and Scot.

7.18 In the whole circumstances the petitioner renews the second part of his motion and
once more invites the Lord Ordinary to report the whole cause to the Inner House for a
ruling under and in terms of rule 34.1(1) of the Rules of the Court.

8. CONCLUSION

8.1 The petitioner in the present proceedings accepts that that the UK Supreme Court should
be afforded the last and authoritative word on the lawfulness under Scots law of Palestine
Action in Scotland. That is a separate question in law from the issue of the lawfulness
under English law of the proscription of Palestine Action in England and Wales. There are
undoubtedly some common background factual and legal issues as between the two
challenges. It is accordingly expedient that the two appeals be heard and determined at
the same time before the same bench of the UK Supreme Court.

8.2 This aim can only be achieved by the court following the course of action which the
petitioner urges on the court.

8.3 The UK Government’s position by contrast seems to be one of impeding or delaying the
final authoritative resolution of these matters in Scotland. That course should not be
permitted it by this court.

8.4 In all these circumstances the petitioner renews his motion as enrolled and moves the
court to grant both parts of that motion.
AIDAN O’NEILL KC
MARK BONI, ADVOCATE
TONY CONVERY, ADVOCATE

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