I have never been so coldly angry as I am at Lord Young’s further suspension of the Scottish judicial review of Palestine Action, now until after the Supreme Court decision in the English case.

The grounds given – the public cost of the judicial review and the management of judicial resources – are ludicrous. The costs in Scotland alone of police time in arresting and charging hundreds of people as terrorists for supporting Palestine Action, the costs of the courts that will try them all, and the potential public cost of keeping scores of people in jail as terrorists, will run into many millions. This massively outweigh the costs of a three day judicial review to decide the legality of all this.

Lord Young granted the judicial review on the explicit grounds that residents of Scotland whose human rights were being infringed in Scotland were entitled to seek a remedy from a Scottish court in Scotland’s separate jurisdiction. He ruled this was irrespective of the existence of proceedings down in London, in another jurisdiction. These were already well underway. Lord Young ruled this…

I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant permission for this judicial review to proceed in Scotland notwithstanding the existence of English proceedings which are at a more advanced stage. As a matter of principle, a petitioner who has standing and whose petition sets out arguments of sufficient merit to satisfy s27B(2)(b) of the 1988 Act should not be refused permission because of the existence of parallel proceedings in another UK jurisdiction. The petitioner claims that his legal rights have been illegally circumscribed by the 2025 Order. He is entitled to look to the courts of his place of residence for a determination of that complaint…

Any decision in England could not found a plea of res judicata in Scotland. A Scottish court would not be required by precedent to follow any decision of the High Court in England. There had been a number of recent examples of important constitutional challenges proceeding in parallel in Scotland and England.

Since the granted permission for the judicial review in January, I have been five times in court trying to make the review actually happen. It has been postponed again and again in a deliberate delaying tactic. It has been postponed so that secret “intelligence” evidence might be heard in secret court sessions that I am permitted no information from. It has been postponed by a series of suspensions granted to the UK government by Lord Young pending developments in England.

Our petition for the judicial review was submitted last October. The review was granted in January. Dates were set for March. Since then it has been simply delayed and delayed and delayed.

At one stage the review was postponed by Lord Young for three weeks so that the Advocate General could appear in person to argue for a suspension – after he had initially refused two motions for suspension. The Advocate General made no new arguments, cited no new precedents, but in a sickening deference to executive authority Lord Young granted the suspension. In which Hell we have been stuck ever since.

We have spent over £200,000, raised from over 2,000 individuals, on multiple court appearances to try to get things moving. That is even without counting two costs awards looming over our heads from procedural motions to get things moving, which Lord Young ruled against and in the UK Government’s favour.

This is not just Lawfare by the government – an effort at constant delay, delay, delay and a deliberate tipping of the review into a procedural morass where no progress is ever made. It is Lawfare in which the judiciary is complicit with the executive. If Lord Young had no intention of allowing a Scottish judicial review before the English case is decided by the Supreme Court, he ought never to have granted permission in the first place. Instead they have exhausted our resources, financial, intellectual and emotional, by enmiring us in a process it is now clear there was never any intention of bringing to a conclusion.

Everybody already knew the English proceedings were at the Court of Appeal and going, either way, to end up at the Supreme Court, at the time Lord Young granted permission to proceed in January. Had he stated then that he was granting permission to proceed, but only after the Supreme Court had decided the English case, we might have given up and not spent £200,000 and nine months of my life. It has been a form of judicial entrapment in which Lord Young has been, at the kindest possible reading, extremely accommodating to the UK government and utterly indifferent to the ordinary Scots seeking to challenge them.

Tomorrow we appear before the Inner House of the Court of Session to discuss – only – whether an appeal against Lord Young’s suspension of the review can be heard on an urgent basis, or whether the appeal will take place in normal time – which would probably mean after the Supreme Court hearing anyway.

Here is Lord Young’s latest decision in full:

COS-P1017-25 Pet: Craig Murray for Judicial Review

Halliday Campbell WS Office of the Advocate General
25 August 2026 Lord Young

The Lord Ordinary, having resumed consideration of the opposed motion of the petitioner to recall the sist granted on 28 May 2026 and to
invite the Lord Ordinary to report the whole cause to the Inner House; refuses same for the reasons set out in the note appended hereto;
thereafter, sists the cause pending the outcome of the Supreme Court decision in Ammori v SSHD; and grants leave to reclaim the interlocutor
of 25 August 2026.

Andrew Young
Note

1. By any interlocutor of today’s date, I have re-sisted the cause on the respondent’s motion and have refused the petitioner’s motion to report
the whole cause to the Inner House in terms of rule 34.1(1). As with a similar motion heard on 14 July 2026, I shall grant leave to reclaim
against this decision.

2. A summary of the procedural position is set out in the Note appended to the interlocutor issued on 14 July 2026. On that date, I refused the
petitioner’s motion to recall a previous sist granted on 28 May 2026. That sist subsequently ended once the determination of the onward
appeal in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department was determined by the Supreme Court. Miss Ammori was granted
permission to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court and the substantive hearing before the Supreme Court has
been fixed for 4th & 5th November 2026.

3. I was addressed by senior counsel for the petitioner and respondent on 20th August 2026 in relation to further procedure in this cause. At
the request of the special advocates previously appointed, I allowed a period for written submissions to be made by the special advocates.
The special advocates subsequently informed the court that they did not wish to make any submissions on further procedure.

4. The petitioner opposed the respondent’s motion to renew the sist pending final determination of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ammori. It
was submitted that these proceedings had been the subject of repeated delay instigated by the respondent which was contrary to the
objective of speedy determination of judicial review proceedings. It was no excuse that these proceedings were delayed by the closed
material procedures and need for special advocates. It was incumbent on the respondent and special advocates to act with alacrity to enable
the speedy determination objective to be satisfied. There was no rule of court expressly allowing the sist of judicial review proceedings. The
court should refuse the sist as incompetent.

5. The petitioner renewed his motion, previously made in July, that this court should report the whole cause to the Inner House with a view to
the Inner House hearing argument on the merits of the petition and answers. In this way, a Scottish appellate decision could be issued and
would be before the Supreme Court when hearing the Ammori appeal. There was a distinct Scottish dimension since individuals in Scotland
were being prevented from expressing support for Palestine Action. Differences could be seen in the approaches adopted by the police and
prosecution authorities in Scotland compared to England. A main plank of the argument in favour of proscription had been sentencing
remarks made in Sheriff Court proceedings. In the absence of an express “leap-frog” provision in Scotland, rule of court 34 should be
utilised to enable Scottish input into the Ammori proceedings before the Supreme Court.

6. The respondent sought a further sist until the issue of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ammori. The reasons for the sist had been articulated
on previous occasions and remained valid. It was likely that many of the issues raised by the petitioner would be finally resolved by the
Supreme Court. If the appeal was successful before the Supreme Court, that would bring these proceedings to an end as the respondent
accepts that the decision would be given effect in Scotland. If the appeal to the Supreme Court was unsuccessful, it was still likely that
several of the major issues would have been resolved leaving any residual issues to be dealt with in these proceedings. The efficient use of
court time and the avoidance of unnecessary costs justified the further sist. The sist was competent under the inherent case management
powers of the court.

7. The motion seeking to have the case reported to the Inner House was opposed as being inappropriate. There was no precedent for a whole
cause to be reported in order that the first substantive determination was by an appellate court. The petitioner was assuming that the Inner
House would have the capacity to hear argument and issue a decision in advance of the Supreme Court hearing. Such indications as the
respondent’s agents had from court administration was that court availability might be an issue. The petitioner was also assuming that the
Supreme Court hearing, which had been fixed for two days on the assumption that it was only dealing with an appeal from the Court of
Appeal, could accommodate input from a Scottish perspective.

8. It was not the primary position of either party that the present proceedings should proceed at this stage to a substantive hearing before me.
The petitioner’s request to have the whole cause reported to the Inner House was recognised by senior counsel to be innovative. I accept
that the lack of a precedent should not exclude the benefits of such an approach being evaluated. Judicial review proceedings which do not
generally involve significant disputed factual matters could, in theory, be more amenable to a leap-frog approach than other types of
proceedings. However, the unique nature of this motion does cause me to hesitate. Unless and until there is guidance from the Inner House
as to the situations in which the Inner House would be willing to hear causes in the absence of a decision of the Outer House, it is difficult
for a Lord Ordinary to assume the role of gate-keeper for the Inner House. As the respondent pointed out, there are many practical issues
which the Inner House are best placed to consider. I have decided that the appropriate course is to refuse the petitioner’s motion to report
under rule 34.1 but to grant leave to reclaim so that the matter can be placed before the Inner House for its re-consideration, if the petitioner
so wishes.

9. I shall grant the respondent’s motion to re-sist until the Supreme Court issues its judgment in Ammori. This remains, in my view, the most
expeditious way to resolve several of the critical issues. Any issues which remain to be resolved after that decision has been issued, can be
focussed for determination in the present petition. I consider this course will minimise legal expense and the burden on the courts’ resources.
Ultimately, this will secure the speediest final determination of the issues which the petitioner raises.

10. I shall make no order in relation to the adjustments recently intimated by the petitioner. I anticipate that a further period of mutual adjustment
may be required but that will depend on the terms of the Supreme Court’s decision.
Andrew Young
25 August 2026

So Lord Young’s plan is that the Supreme Court should consider the judgements of English courts only, and then decide for the whole United Kingdom, leaving any Scotland only issues to be considered by a subsequent Scottish judicial review.

His idea that a Scottish judicial review held after the Supreme Court judgement will be “speedier” than a review held before the Supreme Court judgement is an interesting defiance of the normal concept of time.

He has given up on his earlier justification of “comity” with the English courts now that he can claim he is acknowledging the superiority of the Supreme Court – but with no Scottish input. His argument boils down to this and this only. It will be cheaper not to have a Scottish judicial review. He has no other point.

In which case, why grant one in the first place?

The £200,000 we have spent on this case has been entirely eaten up by Lord Young and the UK government on procedural rubbish. The court has so far heard nothing of the Genocide in Gaza or of the arrest of respectable pensioners in Scotland just for opposing that Genocide.

The court appears determined to keep it that way. They are simply avoiding a confrontation with the British state. A Scottish court is not going to find the ban legal and proportionate. That woud set up a political and constitutional conflict which the Scottish judiciary do not want. So they find ways to avoid the question.

The Scottish government is also deliberately avoiding conflict with the UK over Palestine Action. The decision to charge the alleged Palestine Action activists as having a “terrorism connection” in spray painting Trump’s golf course in Scotland is sickening. The conflation of some spray paint with terrorism is simply ludicrous. The British state has distorted the word “terrorism” beyond all rational meaning.

But it has to be noted that this is not a UK government decision. It is a Scottish decision by the prosecution – the Crown Office, which is under the Lord Advocate. The Lord Advocate is not only appointed by the Scottish Government, he is a minister in John Swinney’s SNP cabinet. They have decided to press the terrorist connection.

It should be remembered that the SNP did not vote against the proscription of Palestine Action in parliament. They have not used their control of Police Scotland to instruct the police to deprioritise arresting old ladies for holding placards, when there is no shortage of more obvious crimes in Scotland, like burglaries which go uninvestigated.

One key point in our case is that the UK government consulted nobody – not one person – in Scotland before the proscription of Palestine Action. They did not consult the Scottish Government, Police Scotland or the Scottish Counter Terrorism Strategy Board (Contest). They consulted the Israeli Embassy, weapons manufacturers, Jewish groups and even a Lebanese Christian group – but no Palestinians. And not Scotland.

The papers in our judicial review have all been copied as it goes along to the Lord Advocate’s office, at his request. The Scottish government could have intervened to support us. The Scottish government is not arguing that it should have been consulted over the proscription, as it has responsibility for police, courts, prisons, and human rights in Scotland. It is not arguing that Scotland is a separate legal jurisdiction and there is a right to a separate Scottish judicial review.

It was open to the Scottish government to intervene to argue those things. They have declined to do so. It is plain to me Swinney supports the proscription of Palestine Action and has no interest in the independence of the Scottish legal system..

It was recently revealed that the Scottish Government has continued through Scottish Enterprise to funnel funds to the Israeli weapons industry in Scotland. We know that in past ministerial positions Swinney gave government money to Israeli settler company Eden Springs to compensate them for boycott losses, and ordered the removal of teaching materials on Palestine from Scottish schools. That is without mentioning the continued cover-up of the content of Angus Robertson’s Scottish government talks with the Israeli Deputy Ambassador.